Lukashenko called talk of a merger with Russia “far-fetched.” At the same time, he warned Moscow that it could lose its only Western ally. What made the “father”, after long and difficult negotiations, once again burst out with harsh statements? Perhaps it's not just economic tensions, but also the fear that the "Kremlin is preparing a successor" in the 2020 elections?
“The President of Russia and I have unequivocally determined that today there is no such issue on the agenda - about unification,” Alexander Lukashenko on Thursday. The statement, which social networks have already called the last point in conversations about the merger of Belarus and Russia, was made at a meeting on the socio-economic development of the republic for 2019. Let us add that this was a part of the meeting between the president and officials open to the press. It can be assumed that harsher words were heard behind closed doors.
“There is no equal basis - there is no union,” the official news agency BelTA reported the words of the “father”. “Everything must happen on an equal basis, and this must be the will of two peoples - the Russian Federation and Belarus... Therefore, for many, many reasons, as you yourself understand, there is no talk of unifying the two states.”
This thesis varied several times in Lukashenko’s speech. “Today there is too much talk... in our society, and among Russians, about the unification of the two states,” the Belarusian president addressed the officials. – Many questions have now arisen in connection with the church in Ukraine about the autocephaly of our church in Belarus. I call these questions very stupid, far-fetched for discussion in our society.”
Lukashenko emphasized that Moscow “does not have the opportunity,” “taking into account the consequences of everything,” to annex the neighboring republic. “Therefore, we need to calm down and stop these conversations that someone has tilted or is tilting someone. No one will bend anyone here,” added the “father.”
There was speculation about the “annexation of Belarus to Russia” in the press and social networks. In fact, Moscow invited its partners to remember the Treaty on the Union State, which Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin signed in 1999. Let us recall that in mid-December, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced Russia’s readiness to implement all points of the agreement, including the formation of a single emission center and a single customs service. According to Medvedev, this would allow for a unified tax and tariff policy and pricing policy. There has been no oncoming movement from Minsk yet.
In your opinion
The Belarusian president, the guarantor of independence, stunned the public with the statement that we could fail and eventually enter "as part of some state". Some commentators immediately connected this alarmist statement with Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Minsk. What terrible thing could a distinguished guest say to the host in a tete-a-tete?
Photo kremlin.ru
Other analysts look at context and audience. On that day, June 22, Alexander Lukashenko made another suggestion to the local vertical, this time in the Shklov region.
The Belarusian model was praised, and now the prospect looms failed state
Maybe the date had an impact (the day of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union), but the fact is that Lukashenko, demanding at the meeting from the vertical "reinforced concrete" carry out economic tasks: “We are at the front. If we don’t survive these years, if we fail, it means that we will either have to join some state, or they will simply wipe their feet on us. “God forbid, they start a war like in Ukraine.”
The Belarusian leader is known for his stern instructions. But he usually scares officials by sending him outside with a broom or handcuffing him. And here - no less than the skiff of the country is outlined. Well, or to put it more culturally, in the language of Western political science, then a natural failed state is a failed, failed state.
Lukashenko's political opponents received a luxurious PR gift and immediately began to be sarcastic: here it is, the result of the 24-year reign of the irreplaceable president and his special path, the Soviet Union - a country on the brink of an abyss.
Guess three times which country you will have to enter, if anything
Naturally, the politicized public did not have painful thoughts about which country could swallow us up.
I remember that Lukashenko, during the years of confrontation with Warsaw, stated that the Poles showed half of Belarus on their maps as their lands. But it is impossible to imagine that NATO members Poland or Lithuania (where, yes, they remember the times of the Grand Duchy, which extended to the current Belarusian lands) would dare to commit aggression against a Russian ally with the risk of a world nuclear war. And Ukraine itself is afraid that the Kremlin will strike through Belarus.
That leaves Russia, the former metropolis, on which Belarus is catastrophically dependent in resource, financial and economic terms. Moreover, it was Russia, through the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbass, and the idea of “Novorossiya”, that showed that it does not shy away from redrawing borders by force, contrary to the Helsinki agreements.
It is also worth remembering that in 2002, after tense negotiations with Putin, Lukashenko, wittingly or unwittingly, gave out juicy details about what was proposed “to divide Belarus into parts and include it in the Russian Federation” So what “even Stalin would not have thought of such an option in his time”.
You will say: a lot of water has flown under the bridge, Moscow has already given up and abandoned plans for incorporation. But even today it’s not just some marginal chauvinists, but a completely respectable Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Moscow Institute of Political and Military Analysis, writes in "Independent Military Review"(appendix to "Nezavisimaya Gazeta") in the context of the collapse of the USSR, that “The majority of Russian citizens do not consider a number of consequences of this collapse fair, including the crossing of some borders. And so Russia will instinctively strive to “restore itself”.
The course of the author’s thought leaves no doubt that under a certain set of circumstances Moscow will not be tormented by pangs of conscience about the termination of Belarusian independence in one form or another. Like, we’re taking what’s ours back.
“Nothing brings people together like a common threat.”
The psychological peculiarity of the current Belarusian president is that he often “says out loud his own fears and phobias”, noted in a comment for Naviny. by political scientist Valery Karbalevich, author of a large research book “Alexander Lukashenko: a political portrait”.
“In this case, the fear is that states are threatened by internal conflicts and increased external influence. Independence becomes vulnerable to external forces", says Karbalevich.
From my side, Andrey Porotnikov, analytical project manager Belarus Security Blog, in the comments for website drew attention to the fact that Lukashenko is not satisfied with the quality of government.
But at the same time, the analyst added, the official leader “I’m not ready to change the system of public administration itself”. Therefore, Lukashenko is trying to stimulate officials by appealing to patriotism. And also resorts to "negative mobilization", because the “Nothing unites people like a common threat”, the interlocutor notes.
In his opinion, Lukashenko’s mood could have been influenced by a not very successful event when he flew to Minsk on June 19 for a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State. Porotnikov draws attention to the fact that the results of the event were very sparingly covered by official sources. He assumes that “Minsk did not get what it expected; Putin did not add any specifics to the expectations of the Belarusian authorities”.
Indeed, there is a big contrast with the results of the April meeting last year, when the officialdom trumpeted that the two leaders had agreed on everything. And in particular - about the end of the oil and gas war, which lasted for more than a year.
Today, no loud statements have been made that, for example, they agreed to bury the hatchet of the milk war. There remains uncertainty with gas prices, and with the issuance of the next credit tranches, and with the status, and with the mutual recognition of visas, and with other bilateral problems.
The analyst admits that Lukashenko is like "experienced manipulator" with his alarmist statement he could have sent a signal to the European Union, which really does not want new problems along the perimeter of its borders.
“And in general, this is a hint that such problems may arise, and then let’s talk about how you can help.”, explains Porotnikov.
Indeed, the prospect of Putin's tanks appearing on the Western Bug is a convincing horror story for Europeans. They have already become softer towards the Belarusian regime, but Minsk wants there to be even less nagging, more flexibility and, most importantly, financial and economic assistance.
Putin doesn’t have to be scared, just take a break
Of course, we can imagine what and how Putin could pin his Belarusian partner against the wall. Maybe he demanded it be posted?
But let us not succumb to the temptation of speculation. Even the fact that economic issues remain hanging in the air is enough to inspire gloomy thoughts in the Belarusian leadership.
In other words, Putin has no need to scare or issue ultimatums. You can just take a royal break and watch your Minsk friends panic.
Today's revival of the Belarusian economy is opportunistic and is tied to rising oil prices. Since Belarus receives it from Russia without duties, it is possible to sell petroleum products to the West with a good margin. But tomorrow oil prices may fall again. Or a tax maneuver in the Russian oil industry will make Belarusian oil refining ineffective.
And then the harsh realities can put into sharp focus that cynical question that was not so long ago rhetorically asked in the much-freaked-out fuss of a separate state with some kind of “special” language? They say that it would be much easier to include both oil refining and the country itself into Russia.
What kind of reforms are there, tip your tongue!
Yes, you can gush with indignation, accuse the authors of such publications of imperial thinking, disrespect for language and sovereignty, but the fact is that the economy of Belarus over the years of independence has not been able to grow, rebuild, diversify so much that Moscow has lost the opportunity to bring the country to its knees with several valve speed.
Moreover, for many years the focus was on Moscow becoming stingier and more pragmatic, and Crimea completely frightened the Belarusian leadership.
However, attempts to diversify the economy are still weak. The lion's share of trade turnover still falls on the eastern neighbor. Moreover, at all sorts of official bilateral get-togethers they hammer home the refrain that mutual trade needs to be increased, now up to $50 billion a year. Although this sounds somewhat schizophrenic given Minsk’s official policy of diversifying foreign economic relations.
We also found ourselves in colossal financial dependence on Russia; we owed it a lot (on state loans alone - about $7.3 billion). And in addition, the Ostrovets NPP is being built with a Russian loan of $10 billion.
This is a trap. Yes, now the Belarusian authorities are fired up with the idea of creating an IT country, but you can’t build it in three days or even three years. The high-tech park, which doesn’t care about Russian oil, has so far generated annual revenues of a billion dollars - this doesn’t make a difference even on a Belarusian scale. In addition, they are trying to integrate the IT sector into the old system with unprofitable social industry enterprises and essentially agriculture. A snake and a hedgehog are crossed.
And since there is no supreme will for such a transformation (and the next presidential elections are creeping up, what kind of reforms are there?), then Belarus is destined to balance on the edge of an abyss. Even if they don’t join, they won’t give up the pleasure of “wiping their feet.”
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Along with the Kremlin benefits, the head of Belarus loses the need to adapt to Russia. Before Putin’s eyes, “the flies are separated from the cutlets.” Alexander Lukashenko began to speak Belarusian. Three minutes was enough to create an information wave.
As it should be: Trump speaks English, Macron speaks French. Putin and Lukashenko are losing their common language... President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko switched to my own:
“We are proud of our history and land, the homeland of outstanding people, our compatriots. We know our roots and honor traditions.”
The speech in the language of the titular nation, and even in a patriotic vein, was unexpected, but pleasant for the listeners. People reacted ambiguously to Lukashenko’s language experiments.
“Most people speak Russian anyway.”
“The president must speak to the people in his native language.”
“One person has nothing to do with it. It's not about him, it's about us."
“He did the right thing - I’m FOR!” - they tell residents of Minsk.
Not such a friend of Belarusianity... Lukashenko used the language of the titular nation only a few times, and in other cases he insulted the language: “Nothing great can be expressed in Belarusian. The Belarusian language is a poor language. There are only two great languages in the world – Russian and English.”
Through a referendum in 1995, he also deprived the language of its state status. Then the young leader set a course for Russia and chose the appropriate language. Now he appeals to language to protect his power, he believes Sergey Naumchik, deputy of the Supreme Council of Belarus (1991-1996):
“In a situation where the Kremlin begins to absorb Belarus, or rather, intensifies this process, he, as they say, instinctively (intuitively) felt that he had to save himself.”
...through national identity, the basic components of which are language, history, coat of arms and flag... In his 3-minute speech, Lukashenko mentioned that...
“The very concept of “spiritual revival” for the Belarusian people is not just a beautiful metaphor.”
For a metaphor to become a reality, you need to take “difficult” steps, says Sergei Naumchik:
“Restore the status of the Belarusian language as the only state language, return Pagonya and the white-red-white flag, open Belarusian-language schools in Minsk and the regions, take a closer look at those pro-Russian organizations that operate in all, I emphasize, regions of Belarus.”
For a quarter of a century, the language has been developing in the non-state sector, is widely used in the media, and competes for speakers through special projects, literature and the Internet. This year we have the opportunity to contribute to its return to official use - during the population census, to indicate our Belarusian-speaking status. But a quick result is achievable only through Lukashenko...
“A permanent transition to the Belarusian language would mean changes in state policy. This would be a signal that if you can do it at the top, you can do it everywhere. And this signal would definitely be immediately picked up by the vertical ranks,” explains the political observer of Radio Liberty. Vitaly Tsygankov.
After all, at the moment we see only a play on words. One in Russian, the second in Belarusian - just like in the recently presented anthem... of the Union State.
Photo: REUTERS / Vasily Fedosenko / FORUM
Alexander Kurylenko Friday, January 4, 2019, 09:19Vitaly Rymashevsky Photo: belsat.eu
The Belarusian political and public figure, co-chairman of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party VITALY RYMASHEVSKY, spoke in an interview with Apostrophe about how Putin will help him retain power in Russia for a long time, what the Kremlin’s maximum and minimum tasks are, where they are located.
Considering the new round of Russian claims against Belarus, the desire for “closer integration”, reinforced by the threat of losing oil discounts for the Republic of Belarus - how can all this be explained?
Of course, the level of confrontation has reached a new level if we compare the level of Belarusian-Russian relations over the past 15 years. These are new demands from the Russian Federation regarding the surrender of Belarusian independence. There were clear demands to surrender sovereignty, insulting to Belarusians and the Belarusian government. Firstly, it was said in the form of "closer integration and a single customs service."
Although it should be noted that these demands are put forward in accordance with those treacherous things that were written down in the plans for building the Union State of the Russian Federation and Belarus 20 years ago (the Treaty on the Union State of 1999 - “Apostrophe”).
Secondly, Russia has made it clear that it will not subsidize the Belarusian economy with cheap energy resources. This is a serious new challenge for the sovereignty of Belarus. The Russians have publicly outlined their clear and tough position at all levels. To describe it briefly, it sounds like this: money in exchange for independence.
- What is Lukashenko’s weak point, why can Moscow make such offers to him?
The most serious mistake he made was at the very beginning of his reign. He came to power under the slogans of resuscitating the USSR and even sought to become the leader of the reanimated Union. It was Lukashenko who lobbied for this idea; he had high ratings in the Russian Federation, compared with Boris Yeltsin. Lukashenko lobbied for the idea of integration with the Russian Federation. This made Belarus a hostage to Russia economically, politically, and militarily. For the first 15 years of his rule, Lukashenko tried to systematically implement this plan: the importance of the Belarusian language and national culture gradually decreased, pro-Russian agents were introduced into the security forces - even if they were ethnic Belarusians, then with pro-Russian views. This was also the case along the ideological vertical: the West was presented as a threat.
Let me remind you that in Belarus there are ideologists in every state-owned enterprise, in the university and in the army as political instructors. Through them the idea of a union with Russia and a united people was carried out. The undermining of economic independence is associated with fatal mistakes: tying the Belarusian economy to the Russian market, cheap energy resources and the lack of reforms that would allow the Belarusian economy to be more competitive in the modern world, and therefore more independent of any state.
These are the main mistakes. In the last 5 years he realized this. His chances of seizing power in Russia are reduced to zero, where power is tightly controlled by the FSB and security forces controlled by Putin. Lukashenko understands that he can either simply be destroyed within the framework of a large state, or made into a small vassal. Therefore, politics gradually began to change in Belarus: there is a lot of talk about diversifying the economy, there are relaxations in the field of the Belarusian language, and the promotion of national culture.
But time is running out. After 20 years of destruction, when the number of children who study in the Belarusian language decreased several times, today it is somewhere around 1-1.5 percent of children in the whole of Belarus. This is the result of Lukashenko’s long policy, now we need to pay for it.
Photo: EPA/UPG
- What is the Kremlin’s interest in “closer integration” of Belarus into Russia?
The economic situation in Russia is not the best and there are no prerequisites for improvement. Therefore, Belarus will be used to strengthen the image of Putin as a “gatherer of Russian lands.” In this context, both the occupation of Crimea and the public challenge to the United States are taking place. The actual annexation of Belarus would cement this “gatherer” image for Putin. For the Russian public, this would be presented as another victory for Russia. This is a huge plus for the current government of the Russian Federation against the backdrop of the economic crisis and impoverishment of the population.
Integration of Belarus is an important element of domestic Russian policy. Their maximum task is the annexation of Belarus, their minimum task is the placement of Russian military bases on the territory of Belarus.
What does the placement of Russian military bases on the territory of Belarus mean and why does Lukashenko refuse it? It is clear to everyone that the Russians will not leave these bases, just as they did not intend to leave Sevastopol. These bases will become springboards for the next stage - the annexation of Belarus.
In Ukraine there was once information that Putin was imposing some Ukrainian security forces on Yanukovych. To what extent are the Belarusian security forces already controlled by Lukashenko, and not by Moscow?
The Russians do not tell Lukashenko who he should appoint to positions. At least, such information has not leaked anywhere yet. Although, of course, many heads of law enforcement agencies come from the Russian Federation, were born in Russia, and many built their careers there. It so traditionally happened that Lukashenko did not place Belarusians in senior power positions in the KGB or the army. Therefore, the Kremlin was already satisfied with Lukashenko’s personnel policy.
I am sure that there is an indirect influence of the Russian special services; they operate quite freely in Belarus. They can, for example, kidnap Ukrainian citizens with complete impunity. An example known throughout the world ( , - “Apostrophe”). Another example of the work of all intelligence services is the exposure of foreign intelligence agents. During Lukashenko’s entire reign, not a single FSB or GRU agent of the Russian Federation was exposed. But this does not mean that they are not here - it means that the Belarusian security forces are not professional and there is significant control by the Russian intelligence services through their agents of influence.
If you look at the military, they are trained in Russian military academies. Lately this dependence has decreased, but many mistakes have been made over 20 years. And why go far for examples when our main military school for young military personnel still bears the name of Suvorov. Let me explain: for the Belarusian lands, Suvorov is an occupier, a murderer and a conqueror. There, cadets are taught by the example of Suvorov, who suppressed uprisings against the Russian Empire on the territory of our country.
How does Belarusian society react to the threats that are now being talked about, and what sentiments does sociology show?
Sociology has remained unchanged for 20 years; the overwhelming majority of Belarusians are in favor of independence. About 15 percent are in favor of unification with Russia. Unlike Ukraine, there is no difference by region - here we are a more unified country. Therefore, Belarusians, of course, are for independence. People have become accustomed to living in their own country, and a new generation has grown up. There are fewer and fewer people nostalgic for the USSR. The Belarusian language is becoming more popular not in everyday life, but among young people as a value. Also, among young people and the majority of the population there is no negative attitude towards the Belarusian national culture. This is practically gone everywhere, with the exception of certain odious individuals, agents of Russian influence among non-governmental organizations or clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus. But I would not say that the opinion of these people has any influence on Belarusian society.
Photo: EPA/UPG
- How will this round of conflict end, given the fact that elections will be held in Belarus in 2020?
The Kremlin chose the timing for confrontation well. The parliamentary campaign in Belarus will take place at the end of 2019, and the presidential campaign at the beginning of 2020. It’s difficult to call it an election, because the result is completely falsified. But I believe, and this opinion is widespread among democratically minded people in Belarus, that the deprivation of economic subsidies from Russia is a big plus.
It was the needle of cheap oil that prevented economic reform, allowed an ineffective economic model to exist, and subsidized unprofitable collective farms and enterprises. All this needs to be reformed long ago to make our economy competitive. Therefore, we call for economic reforms.The authorities will be forced to give more freedom to private business and remove the level of state corruption that hinders the development of both business and society. Lukashenko has every opportunity to follow this scenario, he has a vertical power structure that provides him with falsification of elections and local government administration, and security forces. He controls the power in the country, so this system can withstand the shock of impoverishment of the population, but if there are rapid reforms.
There is a second scenario. Lukashenko is not interested in giving up the independence of Belarus, since this threatens him and his family, so he can bargain with the Russian Federation, try to talk the problem out: meetings with Putin, creating working groups, and so on. Lukashenko, like a cunning player, will try to negotiate and extract maximum preferences for himself.
But now the mood in the Kremlin is different, since the situation in Russia has changed. They need Belarus’ dependence to maintain Putin’s rating. They need another victory. They consider the annexation of Belarus as this victory. Therefore, I am afraid that by getting involved in this bargaining, giving consent to even more serious integration, Lukashenko may make a very serious mistake. Moscow won’t let go so easily this time.
Alexander KurylenkoFound an error - highlight and click Ctrl+Enter
Yesterday, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko stating that “for many, many reasons, as you yourself understand, there is no talk of unifying the two states,” he also said that Russia could lose its only ally in the western direction if the parties do not agree on compensation for losses in connection with the tax maneuver in the oil industry sphere. These words of Lukashenko caused unrest in the expert community.
Head of the Institute of Political Studies, political scientist Sergey Markov:
- What is behind the latest statements by Alexander Lukashenko that he will now buy oil in the Baltic states and process it in Belarus and that he will find other partners. Is this blackmail from Russia?
- This is not blackmail, but a toughening of the political position, since no compromise has been found. In general, we need to be more respectful of our allies. Lukashenko is still not a minor politician, but one of the most brilliant and successful European leaders who has provided his country with political stability and, according to the UN, the highest quality of life in the post-Soviet space along with the Baltic countries. He is successfully implementing the “Chinese model”.
So this is not blackmail, but simply a negotiating position that he is tightening. At the same time, the likelihood that Belarus will leave is very small, because Lukashenko is viewed by Western elites as an enemy, and if he loses Russian protection, he will be overthrown and share the fate of Milosevic, who was simply killed by not providing medical care. Lukashenko understands this very well.
- At the end of last year, rumors were actively circulating almost about the annexation of Belarus to Russia as a solution to the 2024 problem. It’s pointless to talk about this now and is this option no longer being considered?
Well, how can it not be considered, now it’s only the very beginning of 2019, there are still five years before that. So this option is quite possible. There are generally several options for Putin’s power to be extended. The first is a transition to a parliamentary form of government, but this is unlikely, because parliamentary power is easily manipulated by oligarchic groups. The second is the transition to collective leadership such as the State Council. And the third option is a transition to some kind of supranational entity, and among them is the option of a union with Belarus. This is not the only option, because theoretically it is also possible to form the option of a single state of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But with Belarus it would look more natural.
-Will Lukashenko relinquish power?
It all depends on the guarantees. Previously, as far as I understand, he agreed to the following option, which was not implemented then. The option was that he would become the permanent vice president and at the same time the prime minister of the Union State. But then they didn’t go for it, they decided that it would destabilize state institutions. But there are other options and exactly those that he is ready to accept.
Nobody will be embarrassed like that. Even in Ukraine there is a tomos, but there is no autocephaly; most parishes remain in the Russian Orthodox Church. Why sell your soul to the devil and inspire a schism? This is a very deep form of betrayal in subtle religious matters.
Director of the non-governmental organization "International Institute of Modern States", political scientist Alexey Martynov:
- How to evaluate Lukashenko’s latest steps and statements? Are these elements of bargaining with Moscow or is he not choosing Russia for an alliance with Belarus?
Well, of course, these are elements of blackmail, direct blackmail. Indeed, the Belarusian leader has recently allowed himself to behave in this way. He had done this before, but before, his blackmail was usually successful. He got what he wanted. Now appetites are increasing, but in Moscow they have also begun to count money more carefully. In the sense that the situation is such that it requires greater accuracy in financial disciplines. This displeases Lukashenko, who after Nazarbayev is probably the most “ancient” old-timer in the post-Soviet space.
He was used to the fact that he got away with many things, that many economic issues were resolved in his favor. But today the situation is fundamentally different. Lukoshenko is extremely dissatisfied that hidden subsidies from Russia have been reduced and the story of the tax maneuver in the “oil industry” does not suit him very much, because before he received oil almost at domestic Russian prices, processed and sold gasoline to Europe at European prices. And now he will no longer be able to achieve such a margin. Of course, he is extremely dissatisfied with this.
It has already been explained many times - if he wants to have a price for oil or gas like in the neighboring Smolensk region - for this he must be in the Smolensk region. To which he says extremely irritably - Russia wants to absorb him. Nobody wants to absorb it. The question is whether to develop and deepen integration, which the format of the already existing Union State allows, or leave everything as it is. And the main obstacle to integration so far is Lukashenko and his associates, who are satisfied with the existing state of affairs in terms of minimal responsibility but maximum profit.
- What are the prospects for the development of relations between Russia and Belarus? Before New Year rumors were actively discussed almost about the annexation of Belarus to Russia as an option for Putin not to resign in 2024.
These are conversations. Once again, the existing format of the Union State makes it possible to increase integration to a serious depth, up to, if not unification, then a closer union. But this is not happening and there have been no fundamental changes in two decades. Lukashenko likes the situation as it is, and when something happens that he doesn’t like, he turns on blackmail, but other than irritation it causes nothing in Russia, and in Belarus too.
We already have a Union State, there is no need to invent anything else, it exists. Another thing is that what is written on paper is not implemented properly in practice, that’s all. I think that the majority of the Belarusian people, of course, are focused on deepening integration with Russia, on closer relations, on erasing borders, including humanitarian and economic ones, and on paper this already exists. But as for the current Belarusian elite, led by Alexander Lukashenko, they would like to maintain such a privileged position, where there is neither here nor there. To paraphrase a well-known joke, they don’t want to put on panties or take off their cross. But now we have to choose - either maintaining the existing situation, but then pay for oil and gas fairly, or putting into practice what is written on paper. Endless blackmail on the topic - we are fraternal people, so feed us - this is incorrect. From the experience of Ukraine, we see where it has come, although it did exactly the same thing before.
I think that our relations with Belarus will definitely not get worse, but the fact that Belarus decided to follow the Ukrainian path of blackmail is strange.
Independent political scientist, political geographer Dmitry Oreshkin:
- What is behind the latest maneuvers of the Belarusian president? If on the eve of the New Year he went to Moscow twice, now he increasingly says that he does not need Russian oil, that it is possible to buy it through the Baltic states and process it in Belarus. Is this traditional bargaining with Russia or a turn to the West?
I think that Lukashenko is too experienced a fighter to completely close the door. What he says is always a form of pressure or a statement of a trading position. It is clear that Russia is forced to take a tough position. She now obviously no longer has enough funds even to support her own pensioners, and it is becoming more and more expensive to support Lukashenko. At the same time, Russian bosses make it clear that they are ready to pay him if he at least fulfills the political loyalty program. But he still does not recognize either the situation with Crimea, or Abkhazia with South Ossetia, and so on.
They would probably be willing to pay him, but only for him to demonstrate such obedience. But he will not do this, because for him the meaning of existence is power. He will never share power. At the same time, it is clear that all his statements that he didn’t really want, just think - Belarus is losing 400 million dollars a year - he speaks in this style - this means that he received a tough confrontation in Moscow and is now declaring that friendship with Russia it’s not that important to him.
This, of course, is an element of blackmail, as always with him. But this is also a program of action - yes, he will now have to improve relations with the Baltic states. And here a subtle point comes into force - who calculated more accurately, because this is not a purely economic calculation, but a psychological-economic calculation. Lukashenko said that we will tighten our belts, we will live in dugouts, but we will not give in. True, at first he said this in relation to the West, but then just as easily in relation to Russia.
In his own country, he controls the political situation, although the people there live very poorly, much poorer than in Russia and even poorer than in the neighboring Baltic states. But he has the power structures under his control, and therefore he will retain political control; it will be very difficult for Moscow to destabilize him. He is ready for pressure attempts and believes that he can handle it. But in Moscow they think that he won’t cope and will come to bow. And the question here does not come down to calculations on electronic computers of how much someone will win or lose from the oil maneuver. There is also a personal factor here. During his 25 years in power, Lukashenko realized that Moscow can be blackmailed and is successfully doing so.
The result is a staring game - who will look at who? The Kremlin believes that Lukashenko will be forced to come to him, because he really depends heavily on Russian energy resources. Lukashenko is desperately looking for alternatives and says, “I can manage without you.” And it will work out, nothing special will happen to him, although it will be difficult for Belarus.
- At the end of last year, many political scientists actively discussed almost the Anschluss of Belarus as a solution to the 2024 problem and said that Alexander Lukashenko had allegedly already been made an offer that was impossible to refuse...
You see - he refused. Since these topics are discussed in the press, it means they are no longer relevant. The Russian leadership never does what is expected of it. These options were discussed in closed circles three years ago, and even during Medvedev’s time. The option, of course, is a winning one; the public would applaud it, just like the annexation of Crimea. And if you remember, during the annexation of Crimea, a version of the annexation of all of Ukraine was discussed, allegedly they wanted to annex it entirely to the Customs Union, but it did not work out. This means that they planned to do the same with Belarus. But Lukashenko has already eaten 150 dogs in power, and he was the first who thought that the same thing could happen to him as with Crimea, and therefore he pointedly did not support it. Because his power is more valuable to him than everything else.
Accordingly, when they last started discussing options for the accession of Belarus, it was information pressure on Lukashenko. And those who took a pro-Kremlin position said - well, that’s it, dad is broken, where will he go now. He is in a hopeless situation. And those who have been watching all this for a longer time, including myself, noted - why should he break down? He will retreat to the taiga, eat potatoes, Belarusians will receive even less money, but will not break.
After all, Russia cannot introduce “little green men” there, although there has been talk that it would be good to set up a military base there. But Lukashenko did not agree. And he won't agree. So in this situation, Lukashenko is more likely to win, although he will have to explain to the people that the East wanted to destroy our state identity. But this also plays into his hands. After all, Belarusians will essentially support him only on this point - that he is defending our sovereign state. Our state always warms people’s hearts.
It is clear that Lukashenko will now begin to seek protection in the West and will improve relations with the Baltic states. The fact that there will be some kind of liberalization, Westernization in Belarus is, of course, unlikely; he is not ready for this. Lukashenko is only interested in Lukashenko himself in politics. He trusts no one and is not afraid of anyone and clings to his power with all his teeth.
- Is there a chance that Lukashenko will blackmail Moscow by also obtaining a tomos for the Belarusian church, following the Ukrainian example?
Maybe it will come to this, but not right away. Lukashenko, despite all my antipathy towards him, has a very subtle political instinct. He does everything very carefully. Slowly over the past years it has been building a Belarusian identity, which in general did not exist. With his input, the concept is now being created that Belarusians are the heirs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although previously he said that Belarusians are Russians with a mark of quality. But he is in no hurry and does not go too far.
Poroshenko needed this tomos to demonstrate something to his voters before the elections. Lukashenko will do this only when he is confident that he will succeed and that it will be to his benefit. Now he understands that the positions of Moscow security officers are strong in the Belarusian church. This means that he needs time to identify this “fifth column” and put his people in its place. To be sure that his church is loyal to him and not to the Moscow Patriarchate.
But this is not so important at all, because the topic of Orthodoxy is as painful there as it is not in Ukraine. In Belarus there are both Catholics and Protestants, and in general the society is less religious than in Ukraine. He himself does not pretend to be such a believer as Putin or Poroshenko.
More importantly, he creates a construct called “Belarusian state identity.” This is a civil nation. Creates historical myths, like any nation has. Perhaps one of these elements will be the autocephaly of the church, but someday. Now this is not as vitally important for Lukashenko as it is for Poroshenko.
Previously, again, the entire Belarusian elite spoke Russian, but now Lukashenko is gradually introducing the Belarusian language, which has won over the sympathies of Belarusian nationalists. And he will strengthen this in order to strengthen his regime, to mark the borders between Moscow and Minsk.
Russia's situation is complicated. We need to “break” Lukashenko, but we can’t break him, although the pressure is increasing. Is it possible that several billion dollars a year that went to support Belarus will now remain in Russia.
It is possible that they may now begin searching for a person who would risk making a military coup in Belarus. We tried to do this in Montenegro, but it didn’t work. But perhaps some people are developing such a scheme. And if everything remains as before, then Lukashenko will get the feeling that he is a winner.
Political scientist Alexander Ivakhnik believes that these words “put an end to the question of the prospects for the unification of Russia and Belarus (or rather, the latter’s accession to Russia). Warning that he wanted to avoid omissions regarding recent negotiations with the Russian leader, Lukashenko repeated several times: there can be no talk of unifying the two states. Lukashenko’s words clearly confirmed that the “expert” discussions that have spread in Russia about the possibility of a transit of power from Putin to Putin through the creation of a new united state are far from reality. That is, it is possible that these ideas hovered in some government offices. But they strangely ignore the main feature of the political and psychological appearance of the Belarusian leader - his unbridled intoxication with power. Therefore, putting pressure on Old Man, putting him in hopeless conditions and inducing him to give up power is some kind of fantastic task. By the way, Putin, who has known Lukashenko for a long time and well, could hardly seriously consider this scenario.
Lukashenko is a perfect “political animal”, a very sensitive and talented authoritarian leader. During his quarter of a century in power, he rebuilt the entire system for himself and privatized the state in the full sense of the word. With a clearly organized system of control from top to bottom, with repeated shuffling of leadership personnel, including in the security forces, the possibility of some kind of top coup, as a result of which a more “negotiable” figure would take the helm, is almost impossible.
However, it is precisely the system-forming authoritarianism of Lukashenko’s rule that guarantees Russia that Belarus will not leave it for the West. The Belarusian leader, of course, skillfully plays on the tough geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. But the largest countries of liberal democracy will not take a state with an autocratic ruler under their wing; here the opportunities for rapprochement are quite strictly limited. And although the agreement “On the creation of the Union State” is a thing of the past, Lukashenko signed it in 1999 due to inexperience,
Moscow and Minsk are destined to remain allies, albeit difficult and inconvenient ones. And Old Man, of course, will continue to butt heads with Moscow over receiving certain economic benefits, including resorting to rhetorical threats regarding “the loss of the only ally in the western direction” and the organization of alternative oil supplies through the ports of the Baltic countries...”
“Lukashenko has been blackmailing the Kremlin for 18 years. For Belarusian officials, our country is a large, aggressive cash cow, suffering from complexes and phobias, and not a fraternal country. Lukashenko knows the psychology of the Russian authorities very well and takes advantage of it. For Russian officials, a formal union with Belarus is part of political propaganda. There is nothing brotherly in such relations.
The main trading partner of Belarus is our country, which accounted for 39.2% of Belarusian exports and about 59% of imports. Belarus buys more than it sells. The share of exports to Europe is approximately 20%. Guess what Lukashenko is selling to the EU. That’s right, energy resources that come from Russia, that is, Lukashenko is engaged in re-export of gas and oil and makes good money from it.
The tax maneuver that Lukashenko was so excited about involves a gradual abolition of export duties on oil and gas (by 2024) and an increase in the mineral extraction tax. Until now, Belarus has purchased Russian fuel at domestic market prices. As a result, the cost of Russian energy resources for Belarus will increase.
To avoid this, the President of Belarus began to act out another episode of the play “I will leave you for terrible Europe.”
Why is this happening?
Lukashenko is selling Putin his own phobias. He is scaring the Kremlin by saying that he will open his doors to the European Union and will strive to join NATO. Of course, neither one nor the other is possible; no one in the EU or NATO will take over Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. But the Kremlin thinks irrationally. As a result, the Russian authorities obediently take money out of the pockets of Russians and save Lukashenko from collapse. The President of Belarus masterfully forces Russia to make concessions again and again.
How will the dispute between Putin and Lukashenko end?
Belarus will achieve its goal. As we know, the logic of Russian officials is simple - Russians don’t need money - it’s better to feed and save foreign countries, and let our people live in poverty.
Let me remind you that the median salary in Russia is about 25 thousand rubles. At the same time, in the Pskov and Tambov regions it does not exceed 20 thousand rubles.
What to do?
- Understand that our main priority is the quality of life of our citizens.
- Taking into account point 1, stop giving in to Lukashenko’s blackmail.
- Make all decisions regarding our neighbor based on the following logic: the people of Belarus are fraternal for us, but the Lukashenko regime is not.
- In the future, Russia should become a driver of democratic changes in Belarus, since it is beneficial for us to have a free and democratic country next to us.
- Russians and Belarusians are Europeans and our future is possible only in an alliance with the EU countries...”
“What’s wrong with Lukashenko defending the interests of Belarus!? And how does he differ in this regard from Kadyrov in Chechnya!? When you rebuild a relationship, you can count on something. The price of friendship with Belarus is not that great. And we have a lot to learn from them. Try to rebuild a relationship with your wife like you propose to do with Belarus...” - one of the commentators on his post defends Lukashenko from Drandin.
“The position of the leadership of Belarus has long been clear,” another commentator. - It’s a sin not to take money if they give it. And Russia gives generously: oil - average duty of $120 per ton, multiply by 24 million tons and we get almost $2.9 billion in oil subsidies; gas - $230 price of Russian gas for the EU and $130 $ price of gas for the Republic of Belarus. We multiply the difference of $100 by the volume of about 19 billion cubic meters and get $1.9 billion in gas subsidies. A total of $4.8 billion in oil and gas gratuitous subsidies alone, and this is 9% of the GDP of the Republic of Belarus. Plus our loans, plus duty-free access to our market for goods from the Republic of Belarus, and even European-Ukrainian smuggling, plus providing citizens of Belarus with the opportunity to use our free medicine, etc. How long will this waste of Russian public funds continue? Even the tax maneuver is a very mild option for gradually reducing subsidies. Oh well, it would be useful, but it’s not fodder for a horse. Why are we so wasteful?”
What does Minsk want from Moscow? – asks political scientist Andrei Suzdaltsev, analyzing in detail on his page the history of relations between Russia and Belarus and their prospects.
And he answers:
“Based on the national economic model that has developed in Belarus, which is unable to function without Russian financial and resource support, Minsk would like to maintain the system of relations with Russia that was established by 2010-2012, implying Minsk’s unilateral advantages from access to Russian energy resources, Russian loans, orders, technologies and the Russian market.
The weak side of this position of Minsk: the inability to assemble an irrefutable line of arguments proving to Moscow the need to maintain the subsidy policy towards Belarus, which costs the Russian federal budget from 6 to 10 billion dollars a year. Simply put, Moscow gets nothing from Russian-Belarusian integration, except problems with its own constituent entities of the federation...."
What does Moscow want from Minsk?
“Moscow would like to preserve the Union State of Belarus and Russia, but in the dynamics of gradual and steady integration development, the creation of supranational institutions, the merging of economies on the basis of a single currency, which, on the one hand, would eventually lead to structural changes in the Belarusian economy and social sphere, and on the other hand, it would remove the topic of subsidizing the republic from the agenda. It is worth recalling that the subsidy system arose at one time as a substitute for real integration between the two countries.
Naturally, given that the Union State is a political form of integration, over time a joint, strictly coordinated foreign policy would emerge. As a result, one could talk about the creation in the future of a state entity in the form of a weak confederation.
However, the created system of two states would require the unification of political regimes, which dooms Lukashenko’s authoritarianism to disappearance...”
Nevertheless, the expert summarizes, the Belarusian leadership formally supported the results of the summits of December 25 and 29: a similar group was added to the “working group” created under the leadership of the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin on the Belarusian side. An interstate structure has emerged, which, according to the Kremlin, is intended to define a new design for the Union State.
However, given that Lukashenko sees in the “working group” only a kind of last resort for access to Russian resources - receiving much-awaited compensation for rising Russian oil, a reduction in the price of Russian gas in 2020, etc., the parties will not agree. The “working group” is visible evidence that Russian-Belarusian integration is in crisis.
Moreover, on January 1, 2019 in Russia, according to a previously adopted law, the long-awaited tax maneuver began in the oil industry of the Russian Federation...
Moscow’s intransigence casts doubt on Lukashenko’s re-election for a sixth term, as the Kremlin demonstrates its distrust of the Belarusian president, and Lukashenko can only offer his people a “survival strategy” at their own expense. As a result, the Belarusian voter may come to the conclusion that A. Lukashenko’s regime is costing him too much...
Everything is in Lukashenko’s hands. He has a complete idea of what Moscow expects from him and what awaits him personally and the planned dynasty if OTHER scenarios are chosen. Naturally, A. Lukashenko will once again try to choose the “middle path”, chatter Moscow, drown its demands and proposals in months-long empty rhetoric, i.e. return to the old practice in relations with Russia, which he has used for the last two decades. However, Moscow has also lost both the time and resources to once again return to a very expensive spectacle called the Union State. It’s high time to change the repertoire, as well as the actors...”